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Hard Bargains: The Politics of
Heterosexuality
Linda Hirshman*
I'm working on a couple of things at the moment - a book about sex, a
woman's guide to law schools, and a book based on my dissertation, which is
a revision of Thomas Hobbes's social contract theory. And since I know
you're not interested in sex, I thought I'd talk about the social contract -just
kidding!
As you know, Jane Larson, a legal historian from the University of
Wisconsin, and I have written a book, to be published by the Oxford Univer-
sity Press this year, which we call Hard... Bargains: Sex and Politics. And
since in a very important sense Washington and Lee School of Law enabled
me to get started on the book when I was the Lewis Scholar here two years
ago, it seems very fitting to present the grand conclusions in the same place.'
You may think it is a little weird to talk about sex and politics in the same
sentence (other than perhaps about some female's knowledge of the Presi-
dent's anatomy), so the first subject in a grand theory of the politics of sex is
"why bother?"
Let's start to answer that question with a definition of politics, or at least
political theory. Since no one has elected me queen of the world yet that I've
noticed, I'm more doing political theory than politics.
Political theory, according to the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, is the
study of the real or ideal organization of people into societies.2 Now you
* Allen/Berenson Distinguished Visiting Professor, Brandeis University; J.D., Univer-
sity of Chicago, 1969; Ph.D. (Philosophy), University of Illinois at Chicago, 1994. In the Fall
of 1995, ProfessorHirshman was the Frances M. Lewis Scholar in Residence atthe Washington
and Lee University School of Law. On October 10, 1997, Professor Hirshman delivered this
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1. Without the time and resources provided by Frances and Sidney Lewis and Washing-
ton and Lee School of Law, including its superb library, the book of which this essay is a piece
would not have been possible. This essay is dedicated to the Lewises and to the men and
women of the Washington and Lee School of Law faculty and Law Center.
2. 5 THEENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 370 (1967) ("The history of political philoso-
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notice there's nothing in that definition which limits what can constitute a
human society, and it is in fact the case that political theory for centuries
addressed itself to relationships of all sorts: ruler/ruled, to be sure, but also
master/servant, husband/wife, father (no one was very interested in mothers
until recently)/son, deity/worshipper, and so forth.3 It is only in the aftermath
of the wars of religion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that people
began to worry about the murderous possibilities of the state and to theorize
that politics should be limited to only certain aspects of life, like keeping us
from killing one another, rather than telling us how to treat our spouses.4
Thus the state/society or public/private divide was born. Now the alert
among you may be thinking that nothing in this process of reining in a murder-
ous state necessarily requires us to withdraw political analysis from the
relationships we have assigned to the "private" sphere- and there have always
been philosophers who understood that. The great analyst of American
Democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville, about whom I will have more to say later,
was one of them.
But for reasons both honorable and dishonorable, after the Catholics and
Protestants agreed to disagree in England in the seventeenth century, and in
most of the rest of Europe thereafter, the state was limited and the society of
the family and of the heterosexual 'pairing (among many other things) was
largely relegated to the private sphere.5
Butjust because it's been going on for three hundred years doesn't mean
it's right to cast the sexual relationship into the unexamined private sphere.
Think about it: politics is about the terms in which people "live" together.
Controlling violence or defining the legitimate limits of coercion within that
living together is the core subject matter of even the most limited, post-six-
teenth century political theory.
Like the problem of violence, the problem of sex involves human beings
seeking physical access to each other. Like the problem of force, sex raises
the question of the just terms of such access; when, if ever, is it just to force,
extort, pressure, or persuade others to submit to one's will? Like the problem
of force, sex raises the question of controlling the exposure to harm from
necessary contact, as well as the danger of overreaching and the possibility of
life-altering consequences.
phy is the succession of notions about the actual and proper organization of men into collectivi-
ties and the discussion of those notions.").
3. Id.
4. CLASSICS OF MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 733 (Michael Morgan ed., 1992).
5. SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMiLY, 14-17 passim (1989);
SUSANMOLLEROKIN, WOMENINWESTERNPOLITICALTHOUGHT 15-96(1979). As Okin points
out, Rousseau was an interesting exception. Id. at 99-194.
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Seen this way, the historical decision of some great enlightenment
philosophers to assign sex out of the public sphere should not compel us to
make the same mistake. Put another way, measured by the neutral scale of
abstract theory rather than simply accepting the results of the particular story
of western history, it seems relatively obvious that sex is political.
There are, of course, other arguments to make against treating sex as
political rather than historical - and these other arguments are being made in
this very exciting period of sexual transition. If you've been reading the elite
press, some of the arguments will sound familiar to you. First, thinkers argue
that sex is natural and wild and cannot be domesticated by politics.6 This
strand of thought is usually associated with the contemporary revival of what
we call "sociobiology." Sociobiology suggests that social behavior is the
product of biological drives refined over millenia of natural selection in life
on the African savanna, with certain social behaviors emerging as superior to
others.7 Men rape, women weep, and no social structures or politics can
change the picture.
This theory is particularly favored by editorialists at conservative places
like the Washington Times and the New York Times defending sexual harass-
ment and by their strange bedfellows - the ACLU-types defending pornogra-
phy.9
On the other side of the spectrum, some thinkers believe that sex is a
subject for religion and not politics."° So whatever the Bible said to do- from
6. David M. Buss, Evolution and Human Mating, 18 HARV. J.L. &PUB. PoL'Y 537,538,
540 (1995) (discussing evolutionary psychology and male violence); see Richard A. Epstein,
Gender Is for Nouns, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 981, 987 (1992). See generally CAMILLE PAGLIA,
SEX, ART AND AMERICAN CULTURE (1992).
7. See generally Bruce J. Ellis, The Evolution ofSexualAttraction: Evaluative Mecha-
nisms in Women, in THE ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION
OFCULTURE267 (JeromeBarkow etal. eds., 1992) [hereinafterADAPTEDMID]; Margo Wilson
& Martin Daly, The Man Who MistookfHis Wifefor a Chattel, in ADAPTED MIND, supra, at 289.
8. Richard Dooling, Too Many Lawyers? Wait Until 2005, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1997,
§ 1, at 21; Suzanne Fields, Art Survives in Spite oflt All, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1997, at A17;
Suzanne Fields, Women from Mars, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1996, at A21; Wendy Kaminer,
Demasculinizing the Army, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1997, § 7, at 7; Ted Lapkin, Perils of Co-ed
Combat Units, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1997, at B4; Mackubin Thomas Owens, The Eros of
Women in the Military, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1997, at A19; Jeffrey Rosen, Fast Food Justice,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1993, at A27; Harvey A. Silverglate, Harvard Law Caves in to the
Censors, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 1996, at A18.
9. See generally NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY (1995).
10. See, e.g., Don Thorsen & WolfhartPannenberg, Revelation andHomosexualExper-
ience: Bible's Assessment ofHomosexuality, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Nov. 11, 1996, at 34, 34;
Jews Repent Their Sins During Yom Kippur (NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 22, 1996) ("The three
most serious sins in Judaism are murder, adultery and idolatry. It is said that a Jew should give
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the missionary position in the nineteenth century to the Promise Keepers rally
of last week - the goal of sexual regulation is to figure out and enforce what
God said, rather than to meet the standards of political judgment that we apply
to matters that seem on their face equally pressing: how to distribute wealth,
when force is legitimate, who gets to make decisions in business or the state.
But we reject these arguments: as to sociobiology, rape may be natural,
but cancer is also natural; nonetheless we continue to try to control it. More-
over, the picture of possessive yet philandering cave men and their subservi-
ent, coy wives is just too self-serving of the existing relationships of power to
pass without at least a second look.
As to religion, one of the things our survey of western sexual regulation
has turned up is how the same tradition some people invoke for man's natural
mastery over his weaker female companion also provides powerful arguments
for other arrangements. In the time of the Talmud, the rabbis used the exam-
ple of God's responsibility to answer men's prayers to rein in the worst of
male behavior toward unhappy spouses. Probably the most powerful forces
behind the modem claim for female equality are religious concepts - the
Christian equality of souls and Protestant individualism in relation to God.
God may have told Promise Keepers founder Bill McCartney that, like Senate
President and United States Vice President Al Gore (who he probably doesn't
aspire to emulate as a general matter), in a dispute McCartney gets to cast the
tie-breaking vote, but our survey of religious history presents quite a different
picture of what the various gods of western history had in mind.
The question we insist on asking is "Qui bono?" Who is benefitted from
the sexual arrangements set forth as natural and therefore unmodifiable or
divine and similarly beyond human agency?
If sex is political, the next question is "whose politics apply?" There are
many contenders for a governing theory: the ancient philosophy of virtue
ethics asks what arrangements enable the most gifted among us to realize their
full capacities as human beings." Although most of the answers those philos-
ophies provided rested on concepts of naturalness more like sociobiology than
anything philosophical, a modern philosopher of the virtue school, Alexis de
Tocqueville suggested an answer more explicitly political. He suggested that
women should sacrifice themselves in relationships of subordination to their
spouses not because female subordination was natural (or divine) but for
political reasons.'
up his life before committing any of the three.").
11. See, e.g., TERENCE IRWIN, CLASsICAL THOUGHT 4 (1989).
12. 2 ALEXISDETOCQUEVILLE, 2DEMOCRACYINAMERICA 211-14 (Francis Bowen trans.,
Alfred A. Knopf 1972).
HARD BARGAINS: THE POLITICS OF HETEROSEXUALITY 189
In a democracy like America, de Tocqueville wrote, where old habits of
order and obedience have been overthrown, men need virtuous subordinate
women to provide them with a happy home life so that they would be peaceful
and not inclined to rebellion and so that they would be moderate in their
political opinions.'3
So if Queen Victoria is reputed to have enjoined her daughter on her
wedding night to "close your eyes and think of England,"'4 one can describe
de Tocqueville's sexual philosophy as sort of "close your eyes and think of
Washington, D.C."
Classical liberalism, with its roots in the toleration bargain of the early
modem period, has always had an uneasy sexual politics. This is so because
classical liberalism is a mixture of belief in human equality and in the primacy
of freedom and individualism. 5 These commitments come apart when private
individuals use their freedom to engage in acts of private oppression. An
example is the family, in which the male is always the tie breaker. Classical
liberalism solved this problem at the beginning by assuming that sexual
oppression was natural; in recent years liberals have come back to the idea
that sexual activity is natural and ungovernable, only this time it is the
libertinism of the Playboy era that has the stamp of nature on it. 7 Natural
monogamy, natural libertinism - it's amazing how the irresistible natural
course of sexuality ALWAYS benefits the group on the top.
Finally, since the late eighteenth century the western world has been
heavily influenced by the philosophy of utilitarianism, which concentrates
heavily on the physical world and attempts to maximize the sum of pleasures
and minimize pain." We have never seen a strictly utilitarian sexual philoso-
phy, although a lot of the present regime of libertinism rests on the spoken or
unspoken assumption that more sex equals more pleasure.
We say: "a pox on all your houses." Women should not have to sacrifice
themselves for the well-being of the ship of state in sort of a horrible reversal
of the women and children first rule about life boats. Oppression is oppres-
sion regardless of whether it is the President of the United States or of the
President of the ACLU in the privacy of his own home, and more sex is not
13. Id. at212-14.
14. Paul Johnson, 100 Years On: Just How Have We British Changed?; Queen Victoria's
Diamond Jubilee in 1897 Was a High Point for this Country, DAILY MAIL (LONDON), May 24,
1997, at 10.
15. WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 2 (1990).
16. OKIN, supra note 5, passim.
17. Sharon Begley, Infidelity and the Science of Cheating, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 30, 1996,
at 56, 58. See generally DAVID M. Buss, THE EVOLUTION OF DESIRE (1994).
18. KYMLICKA, supra note 15, at 9, 12.
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always better, either for the society or for the individuals involved. A whole
new approach is required.
We suggest, instead, a more light-hearted approach to the matter: we
think sex should be treated as a game. But before you get your hopes up, let
me hasten to say that it's not the game of strip poker we're proposing. It's
something a lot more like the social contract theory I promised you I wouldn't
talk about before.
We mean "game" as in game theory, the mid-twentieth century genius
John von Neumann's elegant scheme for figuring out what will happen if
people act in their own self-interest absent any authoritative structures of
coordination.19 In the sex game, a male and a female player would rather have
sex than remain celibate. But, for example, he may want to have sex with her
on terms of her fidelity and his profligate freedom while she may prefer to
have sex in a context of mutual fidelity or even the reverse of his scenario.
What is to be done? Maybe God will tell them what to do, as many have
throughout history contended. Or maybe they won't have a conflict, because
she's evolved into a creature who craves subordination.
We contend that, implicitly or explicitly, coyly or overtly, the sexual
partners are actually going to bargain with each other, in a political transaction
in which each is going to try to have sex on terms as close to his or her ideal
as possible. Why do we say this? First of all, we contend that all the condi-
tions of bargaining are present, and I'm going to review them for you. Sec-
ond, we contend that treating sexual politics as an occasion for bargaining is
actually politically optimal. Bargaining maximizes individual freedom - a
value we take from classical liberalism - but, if properly supported by back-
ground structures of law, sexual bargaining will avoid the extremes of private
oppression that liberalism allows.
As I run through the conditions of bargaining for sexual politics, I want
you to note how the competing constructions of sexuality - sociobiology,
revelation, etc. - all are directed at avoiding the bargaining situation. This, I
contend, is not a coincidence. Ifthere is no bargaining, the existing structures
of power remain in place.
First, what are the conditions of bargaining?
1. The two parties are interdependent. So for this condition we must
rule out celibacy and make heterosexual sexuality desirable in a significant
number of the cases. Only the social constructionists resist this, contending
that men and women would not desire to have sex if they didn't read about it
first.'0 This was a subject I addressed when I was here last time, and if you
19. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 1 (1994).
20. This line of thinking is generally treated as originating in the deeply original work of
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want my take on it you have to read the 1996 issue of the Washington andLee
Law Review2 (which you should be doing anyway).
2. Conflict exists. This rules out the happy sociobiological picture
of men who want to dominate and women who naturally want to submit.
3. The two parties have some options for bargaining. For this we
must assume that the weaker player, usually the woman, has some bargaining
chips in the form of the value of consensual sex or some rudimentary law
against rape.
4. There is room to come to agreement without dying as a result.
This rules out a lot of sociobiology because, if men must rape to reproduce
their genes, bargaining away their raping power consigns them to the dust
bin of evolution. If women must submit to get men to help them raise the
children (this is the Promise Keepers's bargain, as well as the sociobiologists,
by the way), resisting submission consigns them and their children to the
same evolutionary dead end. The children won't live long enough to repro-
duce.
So the parties want to have sex, they have somewhat different agendas
for the terms of the transaction, they aren't completely disempowered with
regard to one another, and they can compromise without dying.
So he says let's have sex. She says what's it worth to you?
Now the old Borscht Belt comedian Henny Youngman had a story which
answers this and all political questions. Henny Youngman was walking down
the street one day when he met an old friend.
"Henny," said the old friend. "How are you; how's your wife?"
"How's my wife?" answered Henny. "Compared to what?"
Game theorists call Henny Youngman's comparison the Best Alternative
to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA).
How's sex on your terms? Compared to what?
And here's where the law comes in (you knew it had to be in here some-
where). If he can't get her to agree to have sex, what's his BATNA? If there
is no law against rape, his BATNA is to have sex with her without her agree-
ment. If she doesn't want to have sex on his terms, what's her BATNA? If
there is no law against rape, her BATNA is rape. How easy is it going to be
to get someone to agree to have sex if the alternative is a free shot at being a
rape victim?
Michel Foucault, who actually addressed himself to the social construction of the objects of
desire, not desire itself. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HIsTORY OF SEXUALITY (Robert Hurley
trans., Pantheon Books 1978) (1976).
21. Linda R. Hirshman, Was There Sex Before Calvin Klein?, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
929 (1996).
22. RHONA MAHONY, KIDDING OURSELVES 43 (1995).
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Worse than this, as the work of former Tucker lecturer Carol Rose
reveals, her "agreement" in this situation of disempowerment sets in motion
a downward spiral of disempowerment in which every time she agrees to a
bad bargain it weakens her social situation for the next time.' I saw a won-
derful example of this in the popular press while I was working on the book:
the autobiography of actress Claire Bloom.24 In the course of her long concu-
binage relationship with the always overreaching writer Phillip Roth, Roth
demanded one day that Bloom send her teenage daughter away from their
household to live I think with her father in England. Bloom agreed. "After
that," she says in her autobiography, "I was doomed. What could I say no to
after agreeing to send away my daughter?"' She experienced perhaps the
worst example of the downward spiral - the moral downward spiral. Absent
some social floor under the bargaining, the weaker player is going to lose the
first bargain, be weakened, lose worse the second time and so on down the
line.
In the nonsexual context, a wife agrees to quit her job and raise the kids
(I'm using real social data here, not an imaginary world of male nurturers and
female green berets). Cut off from the world of wage labor when he an-
nounces he wants to move to another town, what does she have to bargain
with? She moves. Cut off from wage labor and living in a strange town, he
says he wants her to type his dissertation, say. What does she then have to
bargain with?
And so the game theory analysis of sex reveals a dirty little secret behind
the debate over the requirement of force in rape, the rape shield law, the
offense of date rape, and the Antioch college date rape rules.26 We're not
talking about what sex is: We're just talking about the price. In the world of
sexual bargains, the more demanding the law of rape is, the better is the
BATNA of the weaker player. The better the weaker's alternatives, the more
the stronger player has to yield to the weaker to get to a bargain to have sex.
If there's no law against rape, or the law cannot be enforced in this life
as we know it, then the price of sex will be low. Historically, most societies
that did not prohibit rape on behalf of the female nonetheless extracted a high
price for sex not by prohibiting rape, but by prohibiting adultery and fomica-
23. Carol M. Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA. L. REV.
421, 448 (1992).
24. CLAIRE BLOOM, LEAVING A DOLL'S HOUSE: A MEMOIR 6 (1996).
25. Id.
26. In 1991, Antioch College, in Yellow Springs, Ohio, made national headlines after
adopting a controversial policy requiring students to get verbal consent from their partner at
each level of intimacy, from kissing to sexual intercourse. Kay S. Hymowitz, Where Has Our
Love Gone?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 1995, at A16.
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tion, making heterosexual monogamous marriage the price of sex. But that
did not necessarily empower the weaker player; the empowerment depended
in turn on the terms of marriage. In a marriage system in which there is no
prohibition of marital rape, for example, laws against adultery which make
marriage the price of sexual access simply create a situation in which the
weaker player gets to say no, but once she says yes she exhausts her bargain-
ing power.
In any event, starting in the late nineteenth century, the legal and social
strictures around fornication in America declined27 to the point where the only
legal support for the weaker player in the sexual bargain is the law of rape.
All the talk about false claims and sociobiological rapists and the rest is
a guise for the real issue. What do we as a society want to establish as the
BATNA when the parties come together to bargain over sex? Remember: if
there is no crime of rape or fornication, sex is free. If there is no crime of date
rape, the price of sex is a hamburger and a movie, and sometimes just a movie.
Now maybe as a society we want it like that; individuals will bargain for
sexual access on a case-by-case basis, and we as a society will provide no
alternative to a negotiated agreement, leaving the strong to extract the last
ounce of advantage from their natural physical or social superiority. This is
basically the libertarian position on sex and here, again, the so called liberals
of the ACLU type find themselves in strange political beds.28 I want to note,
by the way, that a truly committed libertarian would be opposed to any law
against rape, including the law against forcible rape. Unlike the laws against
murder, there is no coherent libertarian argument for a law against rape.29
27. JOHND'EMILIo&ESTELLEB.FREEDMAN, INTimATEMATrERs 6(1988).
28. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Humor and Anger Mark End of Supreme Court Term, CONN. L.
TRiB., July 11, 1994, at 8.
As for Scalia's anger, it came June 30 as he read his bitter dissent in Madsen v.
Women's Health Center, Inc., the abortion clinic case, in which the majority said
that judges could protect clinic access through injunctions against anti-abortion
protesters. For eight minutes, Scalia excoriated the majority led by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, with whom Scalia is typically allied. Scalia gave a stirring defense of
the First Amendment and expressed concerns thatjudges could abuse the powerful
new tool that the court was giving them. One American Civil Liberties Union
lawyer in the audience whispered afterward, 'Ithink I'm with Scalia on this one.'
Another, asked if Scalia was the ACLU's new ally, said, 'I think I'm going to be
sick.' Officially, the ACLU, torn by its twin loyalties to abortion rights and speech
rights, declined comment.
Id. (emphasis added).
29. Women, the overwhelming class ofrape victims, do notthreaten men, the overwhelm-
ing majority of perpetrators, with the same violation. Accordingly, men have little reason to
agree to forego violence against recognizable, systematically weaker players, and the core liber-
tarian justification for law as a voluntary, self-interested agreement, falls short.
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But if we wish to make political arrangements for people to live together
in society and if we wish those arrangements to meet the minimum standards
of value established by three thousand years of western secular philosophy for
people who count as citizens - flourishing lives, individual freedom and
maximum pleasure with minimum pain - then we will indeed have to provide
some collective floor beneath which the bargaining cannot push the weaker
player.
Since rape is the bottom line bargaining boundary in the current era of
unenforceable fornication laws, I'll stay with that example, although in the
book we make recommendations about fornication (setting the minimum price
for concubinage), adultery (setting the minimum price of a long term contract
of exclusive supply) and prostitution (setting a minimum wage for sex).
Beginning in the late middle ages, western law reconceived rape as a
protection of female bodily integrity. This is one of the many payoffs for
women from the development of Christianity; with the reconstitution of rape
law, the church was trying to protect its nuns, the first women whose sexuality
was more than a bargaining chip in the hands of their male guardians.3"
Nonetheless, from that day to this, doctrines like the requirement of force and
ultimate resistance by the victim as well as a host of hidden behaviors
throughout the legal system make rape a scant protection against sexual
predation.3" Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, men and
women have struggled over the extent of the protection. The social purity
movement achieved the exclusion of the youngest girls from the free fire zone
with the two decades long campaign to raise the age of consent from the year
set in Roman Law: ten.32 The let-it-all-hang-out liberals of the Model Penal
Code tried to move the age of consent back to ten, but that is a story for
another day.33 Recently, University of Chicago criminal law scholar Steven
Schulhofer has outlined a theory of rape law that would focus on the sexual
autonomy of the potential victim rather than the force used to conclude the
bargain.34 As a matter of theory, his change of terminology does little to
advance the debate. We're not talking about what sex is; we're still talking
about what it costs. But his elegant and careful taxonomy of sexual goods
goes a long way to specify a fair structure for the minimum sexual price.
30. JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX AND CHI-STIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE 148
(1987).
31. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously: Rape Law and Beyond,
I 1 LAW & PHIL. 35, 75 (1992).
32. Jane E. Larson, Even A Worm Will Turn at Last: Rape Reform in Late Nineteenth-
Century America, 9 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 1, 26 (1997).
33. See generally MORRIS PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW (1951).
34. See generally Schulhofer, supra note 31.
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First, according to Schulhofer's proposal, minor intrusions on the body
such as unwanted kisses or hugs should cost only a small price- avoiding the
explicit refusal of the supplier. No means no, but silence, as well as yes,
means yes. The buyer does not have to pay the price of silence.
But where the unwanted intrusion is significant or directed at the sexual
body, the rule is the opposite - positive and clear consent to contact would be
required. No means no and silence means no. The burden of risk in a case of
silence is shifted from the seller to the buyer: a price increase.
Finally, where force is used (presumably after silence or no), the stron-
gest penalties would apply. This fits our analysis of sex as a bargaining or
game transaction because force most strongly restrains the human freedom to
bargain. That is why the fundamental bargain - the social contract - always
involves foregoing some aspects of force.
These rules follow the conventional understandings of the zones of the
body, clearly allocate the burdens of consent, ambiguity and silence, and force
the stronger player to bargain with the weaker. Forced to bargain, each party
will get a chance to ask for something of what he or she wants from the sex.
The law will provide a limit on how little the weaker player can obtain and
therefore limit the downward spiral that can be extracted from her. Hopefully,
people will act in their own interest to attain flourishing, autonomous and
pleasurable lives.
However, by focusing on forcing the bargaining we avoid the pitfall of
the pre-libertine scheme of sexual content - imposing our vision of what the
people should want. Maybe they'll want traditional marriage with the hus-
band as the tie breaker as the condition of sexual transactions and maybe they
won't. Maybe they'll want covenant marriage with attendant protections
against abandonment and maybe they won't. Maybe she'll want him to cover
himself all over with chocolate and then ....
But one thing we'll know for sure: absent natural or divine sanctions for
a particular set of arrangements, the people will have to deal with one another
as people with desires and with aversions that they must respect. They will
have to please each other enough to make the trade.
And it will be a hard bargain, but I hope I've convinced you that from a
moral and political point of view, it's a good deal.
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